Part #1 A Must Read ! from Wade White <'TK><
Corps’ Dam Arguments
Don’t Hold Water
“I am in complete agreement with the recommendation to define restricted areas in terms of maintaining public safety while providing more access. Restricting access only when a hazard is present (i.e. during spilling conditions or other hazardous discharge events) is a sound and practical means of attaining this goal.”
“Allowing the public access to facilities when there is no dangerous turbulence and prohibiting access during hazardous discharge events is a reasonable, common sense management approach. Current restrictions, such as requiring PFD’s and limiting access during certain discharges, have permitted safe public access to facilities for years.”
J. David Norwood
LTC, Corps of Engineers
Commanding
[Regarding a study of proposed restricted area boundaries ] “I would like you to consider defining restricted areas in such a manner that maintains public safety while providing more access than those proposed in your study.”
Albert J. Genetti, Jr.
Major General, U.S. Army
Commanding
Executing an about face from these past management strategies, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Nashville District has announced it will soon permanently restrict access to the tailwaters of 10 dams on the Cumberland River. This came as a surprise to many, and the Corps is moving ahead quickly, even though the way the Corps is proceeding contradicts its own Operational Management Plan policy.
On its website and in public presentations, the Corps has offered four reasons for permanently restricting access to dam tailwaters:
1) Safety
2) Compliance with Corps regulation
3) National security
4) Reduced exposure to liability and lawsuits.
In order to save time, we will not concentrate on the fact that these dam tailwaters are an economic engine for our communities and a main source of income for hundreds of business and entrepreneurs. As proposed, these restrictions create a multi-million dollar loss to several of our river communities. Instead, we will examine the list of the Corps’ reasons for permanent restrictions.
1) Safety
The Corps says safety is the top reason these restrictions are necessary. Safety is the flag the Corps is waving to restrict access to our dams using barricades that will cost taxpayers millions. The Corps announced its intentions in late 2012, and since then it has referenced 14 drownings, which have occurred below the 10 Cumberland River dams since 1970, as a main reason for the barricades. Additionally, when discussing safety, Corps officials cite 3 drownings, 1 serious injury, and 10 near-misses that have occurred since 2009. Because of these incidents, the Corps holds it cannot manage dam tailwaters with a conditions-based solution where areas are restricted during spilling only.
So let’s take a look at the 14 drownings, 1 serious injury, and 10 near-misses on which the Corps makes its case for safety. Using the Freedom of Information Act, I asked for and received the Corps’ drownings report, and I’ve worked with Doug Markham of Doug Markham Outdoors, who used FOIA to obtain the Corps’ report on drownings, injuries, and near-misses since 2009.
First, we can eliminate 6 dams because no drownings have been reported in their tailwaters since the Corps started keeping records in 1970: J. Percy Priest, Dale Hollow, Wolf Creek, Laurel River, Martins Fork and Cordell Hull dams. Yet Corps leaders want to spend millions to barricade them.
From the 14 drownings at the 4 remaining dams, we can eliminate 5 drownings as they were from bank fishermen who either fell or jumped in the water. Let’s start an equation:
Ø 14 Number of drownings reported by Corps at Cumberland River dams since 1970
- 5 Drownings from bank fishing
Now we are down to 9 drownings in 42 years at Cumberland River dams. Let’s examine those 9.
1). At Old Hickory Dam in 1970, a person drowned 150' below the dam. No life jacket was worn by the victim, and the cause is listed as UNKNOWN in the drowning report. Spillways were open.
2). At Old Hickory Dam in 1980, a boat was found lodged against a buoy 1/2 mile below the dam. The cause was listed as UNKNOWN, and it is also unknown if the person was wearing a life jacket.
3). At Old Hickory Dam in 1981, two men were in a boat was tied to the dam. No warning was given that the generators were to be turned on. When the generators came on, the boat capsized. One man was rescued; the other man was not wearing a life jacket, and he drowned. The 1981 report goes on to say:
“Only at two of our projects do we have an audible warning device that alerts the public that a hydropower unit is about to begin generation. At this time of startup, the tail waters become the most dangerous. The remaining projects, including Old Hickory, have only a sign warning of dangerous waters.”
The Corps settled the resulting lawsuit out of court for $35,000. The Corps was sued because no warning system was in place or used. In 1997 a sign was placed below Old Hickory Dam in requiring life jackets, and warning horns were installed to alert boaters of generator start-ups. The signs and horns were part of an “events-oriented safety plan for the tailwaters.”
4 & 5) At Old Hickory in 1997, two men were tied to the dam under Unit # 3. Apparently, the powerhouse operator did not know or see the boat and brought Unit #1 from condense to float. The air pocket capsized the boat. Neither man was wearing a PFD, and both men drowned. Families of victims sued and lost because the victims had ignored the posted signs requiring the wearing of life jackets

6). At Cheatham Dam in 2007, two men anchored their boat below open spill gates. The boat’s motor would not start, and the boat began taking on water. The two men jumped into the water to swim to the bank. One made it; the other did not. Both were said to be wearing PFDs. However, the PFD was found floating downstream with the rest of the contents of the boat. If a PFD was worn, it doesn't appear it was worn properly.
7). At Center Hill Dam in 2009, a man and his grandson were in an 8-foot long plastic boat equipped with only a trolling motor. They were warned to pull back from the dam so that the gates could be opened. They did pull back; however, they trolled back too close to the spillway, and their 8-foot boat began to capsize. Both occupants jumped into the water. The grandson swam back to the boat and held on; the grandfather was found later, and his life jacket was over his head. The rescuers stated it looked as though the PFD was never zipped up—that it was worn improperly.
8). At Barkley Dam in 2010, a fisherman trolled too close to the spillway and lost his boat. He was wearing a PFD and drowned in the turbulent waters. This is the only drowning reported where a PFD was properly worn.
9). At Cheatham Dam in 2010, two fishermen maneuvered their boat too close to the spillway and got sucked into the gate, causing the boat to flip. One man was rescued, and the other man drowned. Both were wearing pull-cord life vests. The drowned victim didn't pull the cord to activate the life vest. Improper PFD use ended in a drowning.
Let’s continue our equation:
Ø 14 Number of drownings reported by Corps at Cumberland River dams since 1970
- 5 Drownings from bank fishing
- 1 Drowning from “unknown” causes, but spillways open and no PFD worn
- 1 Drowning—unknown if spillways open or PFD worn; facts not known
- 3 Drownings occurred when water discharged without warning, and no PFD worn
- 3 No PFD worn, or PFD worn improperly, and water spilling
- 1 Victim was wearing a PFD but was too close to gate during spilling
0 Potential number of deaths if PFDs had been worn correctly AND conditions-based restriction had been enforced during spilling.
Let me reiterate that powerful number. IF conditions-based restrictions had been enforced during spilling—with lights and sirens warning of pending spillage—and PFDs had been worn properly, zero may have been the number of deaths at 10 dams in 42 years.
Now let’s examine the Corps’ report outlining incidents in restricted areas around dams from 2009-2012. In its brochure titled, “Restricted Area Boundaries,” the Corps states: “Since 2009, 3 fatalities, 1 serious injury, and 10 near misses/rescues have occurred in hazardous waters immediately downstream of dams on the Cumberland River and its adjoining tributaries.”
While it is unclear whether this statement is a deliberate attempt by the Corps to mislead, these facts are clear from reading the incident report:
· Of the 3 fatalities cited, only 1 victim was properly wearing a PFD, and that victim drowned next to an open spillway gate. This drowning might have been prevented with a warning system and conditions-based restrictions.
· The 1 serious injury occurred while the power plant was cleaning out debris; workers were unaware a boater had entered the area, and debris landed on the bow of the boat, knocking the person against the windshield. The victim never went in the water. This injury could have been prevented with a warning system and conditions-based restrictions.
· Of the 10 near misses/rescues, ALL occurred during sluicing or open spillway gates. Conditions-based restrictions and proper warning could have prevented all 10 incidents.
Indeed, the Corps goes a step farther in discussing the 3 fatalities, 1 serious injury, and 10 near misses/rescues since 2009, stating, “Life jacket wear has been ineffective in these areas, since all of the victims who drowned wore a life jacket.” I cannot overemphasize the gross distortion of facts in this statement. The undistorted truth is this:
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