Part #2 Wade White ... <'TK><
· Regarding the 3 fatalities, 1 victim was wearing manually inflatable PFD, which he did not inflate. One victim’s PFD was found over his head, indicating it was not worn properly. The third victim was wearing his PFD properly and drowned next to an open spillway gate.
· Regarding the 1 serious injury, the victim never entered the water, so this incident cannot be used to support the statement “life jacket wear has been ineffective…”
· Regarding the 10 near-misses, the Corps’ reports show ALL OF THEM WERE WEARING LIFE JACKETS PROPERLY. How can the Corps hold that “life jacket wear has been ineffective in these areas…” when ALL of the people pulled from the water alive were wearing life jackets.
In the Q&A section of the Corps’ website, you will see the following:
"Q12. There have been only 14 fatalities since 1970. Why not just keep the event-oriented restrictions? Answer: While this is a relatively low number in comparison to the district’s total number of fatalities, any fatality is tragic. Current event-oriented restrictions are not protective enough of boaters and visitors around dams."
While it is true that any fatality is tragic, the statement, “Current event-oriented restrictions are not protective enough…” is false. Remember our equation. Of the 14 fatalities, 0 occurred when waters were calm. Many options for safety exist, including an option to restrict access only during spilling events, which would allow fishing during non-spilling times. Many have suggested this as a proper solution, and I advocate it as well. A cost-effective solution is for the Corps to restrict access during times of spilling; install horns, lights and warning systems; install signage; and educate the public about the dangers of spilling. The Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency and the Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources both stated if a conditions-based approach is used, then they would increase their patrols during hazardous spilling times.
If the warning systems described above had been deployed with conditions-based restrictions, I believe all of the drownings could have been prevented. And we could still keep our multi-million dollar industry open during these tough economic times.
2) Compliance with Corps Regulation
On its website, the Corps states it has decided to become fully compliant with Engineer Regulation 1130-2-520, Chapter 10, by permanently restricting access upstream and downstream of dams. It is our understanding that this regulation was known as ER 1130-2-341, prior to 1996. This regulation addresses restricted areas for hazardous waters at dams.
LTC James DeLapp, Commander of the Corps’ Nashville District, has stated unless the Corps permanently restricts these areas, it will not be in compliance with the regulation. We believe the Corps has been and remains in FULL compliance with regulation 1130-2-520, by allowing access during non-hazardous times. We are not alone in that thought. All previous district commanders have interpreted this regulation to allow access during non-hazardous times.
We contend that since it was updated 17 years ago, and for years prior, this regulation has been interpreted as a conditions-based regulation—allowing access during non-hazardous times. As the Corps’ stellar safety record shows, this conditions-based approach has worked since 1967 and still works today.
The Corps has taken great care to meet its regulation by ingraining it in its own Operational Management Plans at each facility. This was written regarding ER 1130-2-341 - precursor to the 1996 ER 1130-2-520:
“Restricted area boundaries shall ‘ordinarily’ be fixed and not variable. Our boundaries will be fixed, but access within these fixed boundaries will be allowed when conditions are not hazardous….the intake and discharge areas at our structures are NOT always hazardous, even during some discharge events.”
Memorandum for Operational Management Plans for Restricted Areas.
J. David Norwood, LTC Corps of Engineers, Commanding.
The Corps is implementing a 180-degree turnaround in its interpretation of the regulation—moving from conditions-based restrictions to permanent restrictions. Even after ER 1130-2-341 became ER 1130-2-520, the regulation remained the same in defining how to restrict by using the word “ordinarily.”
Regulation ER 1130-2-520 chapter 10 (c) is the regulation LTC DeLapp is using to insist on permanent barricades for the 10 dams. The regulation states, “Restricted area boundaries shall ‘ordinarily’ be established based on high flow condition, not variable with fluctuating flows, intermittent discharges, or seasonal variations.”
What is curious is that, while no on-the-ground conditions have changed at these dams, permanent restrictions are now an imminent need according to the Corps. Why did the previous Nashville District Commanders not feel this urgency? In fact, this is how all the past District Commanders interpreted the regulation:
From the current Operational Management Plan (OMP) - Barkley Project:
OMP 32-2
a. This chapter provides for the establishment, operations and maintenance of restricted areas for hazardous waters at projects structures and is written in COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF ER 1130-2-520 [emphasis added].
c. Restricted areas are not necessarily permanent in nature, but can be event oriented as described herein.
As you will see below in the current Corps plans, written by engineers of the Corps - ER 1130-2-520 doesn’t REQUIRE permanent barricades.
OMP 32-5
“Paragraph 10-2(c) of ER 1130-2-520 stipulates that restricted area boundaries shall ‘ordinarily’ be fixed and not variable. The boundaries at the Barkley project will be fixed, but access within these fixed boundaries will be allowed [emphasis added] when conditions are not hazardous.”
All Commanders and Operational Management Plans since the building of these 10 dams have wanted, implemented, and encouraged conditions-based access for boaters and fishermen. We believe, as did all previous commanders, that a conditions-based approach meets the regulation. LTC DeLapp’s statement that the Corps has finally decided to fully comply with the regulation is in opposition to the Corps’ own 40-year management strategy.
The issue of barricades and permanent restrictions is not a new one. The Corps has considered the possibility of a barricade in the past, and this was their determination:
“A physical barrier to boats is not practical either upstream or downstream of the power plant, spillway and lock. Floating debris prohibits the installation of a continuous barrier in the headwaters. Turbulent waters and floating debris prohibit the installation of a continuous barrier in the tailwaters. The danger buoys and signs provide sufficient warning of the hazards and there is NO NEED FOR A BARRIER TO KEEP VESSELS FROM ENTERING THE RESTRICTED AREAS” [emphasis added].
(Operational Management Plan at the Barkley project section 32-11, page 32-10)
For over 40 years, the Corps of Engineers has interpreted its own policies in a way that allows and even encourages access to fishing areas during non-hazardous times. It is only recently that a new interpretation is being made needlessly. There is no change to the conditions at the dam–nothing new. No one knows this better than the Corps’ own former commander:
“Public acceptance. An arbitrary change in policy that now prohibits access to areas that have been used since the District’s projects were constructed will receive little, if any, public or Congressional support. It will be extremely difficult to maintain any credibility when trying to convince the public that something has suddenly changed that now makes these areas unsafe. The public will be more apt to accept a realistic approach that heightens their awareness of potential hazards and protects them against actual hazards.”
J. David Norwood, LTC,
Corps of Engineers, Commanding
3) National Security
The Corps’ “Restricted Area Boundaries” brochure lists security as a reason for permanent restrictions at the dams, stating:
“A recent inspection by the DOD Inspector General and the Security Office revealed that fully implementing Corps policy is needed to address this security concern, enhance the security of government infrastructure, and safeguard the public.”
The above statement is a generic one. Yes, policies should be enforced and, as we have shown above, they have been fully enforced. This statement by the DOD inspector does not point to a barricade or infer that the DOD inspector supports a barricade as a way of stopping a terrorist attack. This argument does not seem plausible.
Take a look at the photo below. If a terrorist attack is planned by boat, one can simply drive the boat directly to the right of the planned barricade and into the heart of the lock area. Barricading off the fishing area will not deter an attack on the dam, because the waterborne access to the lock is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The only people who cannot reach the dam will be law abiding citizens.

Downloaded from Corps website
Interestingly, during the restricted areas presentation at a public meeting in Grand Rivers, KY, LTC DeLapp proudly stated he is bringing back public tours of Corps dam projects for the first time since 9/11. If national security is such a concern that boats should be restricted from the outside of the dams, then why would the public be allowed to tour inside the dams after this being shut down since September 11, 2001? And why would bank fishing next to the dams be encouraged? The reasoning of Corps officials is confusing at best, and with the implementation of the barricades, it is truly detrimental to local economies.
|
